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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the role of simplified heuristics in the formation of preferences for public 
goods. Political scientists have suggested that voters use simplified heuristics based on the 
positions of familiar parties to infer how a proposed policy will affect them and to cast a vote in 
line with their interests and values. Here, we use a two-stage field-survey experiment to 
investigate how knowledge of party positions affects policy choices. We followed standard 
procedures in developing an attribute-based choice experiment on alternative land-use policies in 
Switzerland. In contrast to the usual formulation, however, the hypothetical costs of the proposed 
policies were formulated as a percentage change in taxes. The benefit of this formulation relative 
to the usual absolute money amounts is that the credibility of the (hypothetical) costs for 
respondents does not depend on respondent income. Furthermore, the formulation allowed us to 
solicit party positions on the proposed policies. Six out of eight contacted parties provided their 
positions. We then conducted a split-sample mail survey where we included a table of the party 
positions with a sub-sample of the questionnaires. We report six main experimental results. (1) 
The response rate of the survey was unaffected by the party positions. (2) The proportion of no-
choice answers was decreased by forty percent relative to the control. (3) The party information 
significantly affected the choices directly and in interaction with respondents’ general attitudes 
towards public spending for nature and landscape conservation and thus affected the way how 
individuals mapped from general attitudes to preferences for specific policies. (4) The 
information interacted with educational level in only eight out of forty choice sets, suggesting 
that even the more educated relied on simplified heuristics. (5) Respondents who knew the party 
positions were more sensitive to the tax attribute. (6) For respondents with medium and higher 
tax bills, the resulting willingness-to-pay estimates were decreased by a factor of two to ten 
relative to the control. These findings suggest that the party information helped the respondents 
to articulate more consistent preferences than in the treatment without the party information. 
 
Key words: agriculture, bounded rationality, choice experiment, contingent valuation, 
landscape, heuristics, information, preference formation, public goods, voting. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Research on social psychology and public opinion has identified a number of empirical 
regularities on how people form preferences in the political and social spheres (Druckman and 
Lupia, 2000). First, in areas where people do not have significant prior experience, preferences 
are “constructed” during the decision task itself. The process of preference formation can easily 
be influenced by contextual factors (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). Second, social interactions 
shape decisions. People are often persuaded by individuals they personally interact with and by 
organizations sharing ideological views and interests (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Manski, 
2000). In the political arena, such influences affect the decisions on whether and how to vote 
(Beck et al., 2002). Third, voter awareness of specific issues is quite low and hence susceptibility 
to persuasion is high (Zaller, 1992). Based on these findings, a growing body of research in 
economics assumes that individual beliefs and preferences on many issues are flexible, 
particularly in areas where people do not have significant personal involvement, and that as a 
consequence people are vulnerable to persuasion and influence (Conlisk, 1996; Murphy and 
Shleifer, 2004). 
For the important empirical context of collective decisions, the current evidence on these 
regularities rests on observational, correlative studies. Researchers have surveyed voters’ 
knowledge of contextual cues such as party positions in order to explore how this knowledge 
may have influenced the voting decisions, controlling for other factors such as prior knowledge 
about the details of the proposition (e.g. Lupia 1994). Unfortunately, the role of the contextual 
factors cannot be properly identified in these studies since the voters’ knowledge is likely to be 
endogenously determined by individual characteristics that may themselves affect the decision. 
To cleanly separate the effects of the contextual factors and the individual characteristics it is 
necessary to conduct an experiment in which important contextual factors are fully controlled. 
Such a study would allow one to better understand how specific contextual factors shape 
preferences for public goods in interaction with individual characteristics. 
The aim of the present study is to provide such an experiment. We report the results of a 
factorial experiment investigating how the characteristics of individual voters, of proposed 
policies and of information environments interact in individual choices about public goods. The 
contextual factor we examine is the availability of credible information about the positions of 
large political parties and interest groups. This factor is of particular interest for three reasons. 
First, research in economics and the political sciences suggests that reputable competing parties 
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have an interest to produce reliable signals (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Lupia and Matsusaka, 
2004). Second, the positions of parties with known ideological orientation are a primary source 
of information that voters use in collective decisions, while the role of media coverage and 
interpersonal communications is rather in information transmission (Beck et al. 2002). Third, 
accessibility of party information is an important factor distinguishing preference formation in 
voting decisions and stated preference surveys (Schläpfer and Hanley, 2006). The study may 
thus shed new light on the question why stated preferences may not predict the preferences 
revealed in collective decisions. We thus examine individual choices about the provision of 
public goods by respondents with and without access to party positions. 
We find that knowledge of party positions affected individual decisions in several 
important ways. The results experimentally confirm the earlier suggestion by political scientists 
that voters use simplified heuristics to make decisions in line with their interests and values. The 
findings suggest that the attention to different information environments may contribute to a 
better understanding of preferences for public goods in voting decisions and surveys. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief 
introduction to related literature. Sections 3 and 4 describe the empirical methods and the results. 
Section 5 contains a discussion, followed by conclusions. 
 
 
2. Background 
 
People appear to have relatively stable attitudes towards broadly defined classes of public goods 
and services such as education, public transportation, or the environment. They hold views about 
whether more, less or the current amount of public money should be spent on policies related to 
these classes of public goods and services. Such attitudes or tastes can be understood as 
summary positions (relative to other people’s summary positions) that are shaped in the context 
of real-world debates about specific policy issues belonging to these classes of public goods 
(Kahneman et al., 1999). 
 If people also have stable preferences for specific policy proposals that have never been 
subject to public debate is less clear. In areas where people do not have significant prior 
experience, preferences appear to be constructed from underlying values (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1984). Preference formation is easily influenced by contextual factors (Gregory et al., 
1993; Schkade and Payne, 1994; Payne et al., 1999; Clark et al., 2000). Hence, it is not difficult 
to devise decision settings in which humans fail to retrieve and process preference information 
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consistently (Boyle et al., 1994; Hanley and Shogren, 2005). It is a much greater challenge to 
find out how decision settings can be structured in such ways that humans are capable of making 
consistent decisions in spite of well-known cognitive limitations. This has become particularly 
evident from attempts to use surveys to measure preferences for public goods such as the 
preservation of endangered species or wilderness areas (McFadden, 1999). 
However, psychologists and economists have made important progress in understanding 
why human decisions are often inconsistent. McFadden (1999) notes that “careful attention to 
the processes that consumers use to define tasks and construct preferences may allow one to look 
behind the superficial errors to uncover stable principles, attitudes, and preferences upon which a 
new economic analysis might be built.” Psychologists view preferences as constructed from 
more stable attitudes by a context-dependent process that determines the prominence given to 
various attitudes and the tradeoffs between them (see Kahneman et al. 1999). According to 
psychologists, a suitable choice of context may thus help improve the “rationality” of 
preferences elicited in surveys (Payne et al., 1999).  
Political scientists have shown how environmental factors can restore apparently rational 
decisions in the empirically important context of voting. Voters in referenda use informational 
“short cuts”, in particular information about the positions of trustworthy, knowledgeable 
individuals or groups with known preferences over outcomes, to infer how a proposition will 
affect them and to make choices that appear to be consistent with their interests and values 
(Bowler and Donovan, 1998; Lupia, 1994; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Lupia and Matsusaka, 
2004). Lupia (1994), for instance, who analyzed a California referendum about complex 
insurance reform initiatives found that voters who possessed relatively low levels of factual 
knowledge about the initiatives but could correctly identify the insurance industry’s preferences 
on a particular proposition were much more likely to emulate the behaviour of relatively well-
informed voters on that proposition than similarly uninformed voters who did not know the 
insurance industry’s position. 
While the results of these studies are important for understanding voting decisions, they 
are not suited to properly identify the role of the contextual factors in voting decisions for two 
reasons. First, in observational studies correlating voting decisions with voters’ knowledge of 
party positions or other contextual factors (controlling for knowledge about the details of the 
proposition), the effects of knowing the party positions are potentially confounded with effects 
of individual characteristics. This is because individual knowledge of the party positions is likely 
to be endogenously determined by individual characteristics that may themselves affect the 
decision. Second, due to the inherent tendency of the political process to produce policy 
4 
proposals that are near median preferences, the mere fact that a proposal made it to the final 
decision stage constitutes a contextual cue that can be exploited in simplified heuristics. For 
instance, green voters may in many cases know how to vote their interests in an open-space 
preservation initiative without looking at the details of the proposition and without knowledge of 
party positions. In an observational study this can easily create the illusion that voters possess the 
cognitive capabilities to independently and reliably process large amounts of information 
relevant to complex decisions about specific changes in the levels of unfamiliar public goods 
offered at specified costs. 
Hence, to fully isolate the role of context in voting decisions, two conditions must be 
realized. First, the contextual factors of interest must be experimentally controlled by randomly 
allocating subjects to the alternative treatments conditions. Second, it is necessary to use random 
policy proposals that may or may not be similar to the proposals that might be expected to evolve 
from a typical political process.  
In a first experiment following this rationale, Schläpfer and Schmitt (2007) examined 
effects of simplified heuristics based on knowledge of party positions in a contingent-valuation 
survey experiment. The present paper extends that research in two important ways. First, the 
present study is designed in the context of an attribute-based choice-experiment, which is the 
most popular preference elicitation approach today. More importantly, the present study 
examines for the first time how the information context interacts with individual characteristics. 
Specifically, it examines how knowledge about party positions affects environmental decisions 
by individuals with different attitudes, education, tax burden and urban vs. rural residence. 
 
 
3. Methods 
 
3.1. Experimental design 
 
In this study we applied a relatively new variant of stated-preference elicitation techniques, 
broadly referred to as attribute-based methods (Louviere et al. 2000; Bennett and Blamey 2001; 
Holmes and Adamowicz, 2003; Holmes and Boyle 2005). In attribute-based stated-preference 
questions, a policy alternative is decomposed into k singularly and precisely specified attributes, 
one of which is the bid amount. Experimental design procedures are used to construct 
alternatives from the attribute set. Respondents are asked to choose one alternative from a choice 
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set containing two or more policy alternatives. One of the policy alternatives is typically the 
status quo. Questions may be posed in the referendum voting format recommended by the 
NOAA panel (Arrow et al., 1993), but in contrast to many contingent valuation studies, 
respondents are given a series of choice sets. 
The policy alternatives of the present study were structured around alternative land-use 
patterns for the Swiss Plateau, i.e. the lowlands between the Jura mountain range and the Alps. 
As in Holmes and Boyle (2005), each choice set consisted of two policy alternatives, one of 
them representing the status quo. The alternatives were characterized by n=6 landscape attributes 
and a “price” in terms of the tax money required to maintain the landscape pattern through, for 
instance, land-use incentive schemes. The tax attribute was formulated as a percentage change in 
the direct taxes on income and wealth. This formulation potentially enhances scenario credibility 
relative to the standard format with absolute money amounts (see Champ et al. 2002; Flores and 
Strong, 2007; Schläpfer and Bräuer, 2007), and it allowed us later on to collect party positions on 
the proposed policies.  
The six land uses were ‘forest’, ‘high-intensity grassland’, ‘crop land’, ‘low-intensity 
meadows’, ‘orchards, hedgerows, and trees’, and ‘nature reserves’. The six landscape attributes 
described the extent of the six main land uses as a percentage of the total land surface. Given the 
current goal to reduce agricultural subsidies in the lowlands, the attribute levels were chosen in 
such ways that most changes from the status quo would be less expensive, although possibly at 
the cost of less aesthetic value of the landscape, for instance, due to the spread of forest (Table 
1). We framed the choice problem as a referendum in which citizens were asked to vote in favor 
or against propositions offering alternative land-use policy outcomes. 
The program Gosset was used to generate the fractional factorial design of the choice 
experiment (Hardin and Sloane, 2003). Two or three attribute levels were chosen for the 
individual attributes, depending on whether only linear effects were of interest or both linear and 
quadratic. We specified an I-optimal design (minimizing the average prediction variance) and a 
target of 40 policy alternatives, which is sufficient to estimate all main effects and one-way 
interactions, while still keeping 15 extra design points to further reduce the average prediction 
variance. To keep the choice tasks manageable, the resulting forty choice sets were allocated to 
five blocks (different questionnaires) consisting of eight choice sets each. Since the percentages 
of land in the n different uses must sum to a constant land surface, only n-1 land-use attributes 
were experimentally varied in the factorial design. The level of the remaining attribute (high-
intensity grassland) was given by the difference between the total undeveloped land, which 
amounted to 74% of the total land surface, and the sum of the levels of all the other attributes 
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(land uses). As a consequence, each change in a particular land-use type is a change at the 
expense (or in favour) of the land use represented by the free variable. 
 In accordance with the aims of the study, we added two additional features to the 
standard choice experiment design. First, we stratified our sample to be able to identify any 
variation in responses among the urban, periurban and rural sub-populations. We chose a study 
region near Zurich that appeared to be topographically representative of the Swiss Plateau and 
selected one urban (Zurich), two periurban (Faellanden and Greifensee) and two rural 
(Baeretswil and Grueningen) local jurisdictions (municipalities) from which to recruit potential 
respondents. These municipalities were selected to represent three strongly contrasting (while 
still sufficiently large) sub-populations in terms of income, agricultural employment, and voting 
behaviour in past land-use related referendum decisions (Table 2). 
Second, we added the voting recommendations treatment (see Survey procedures) as 
another orthogonal factor. Thus, one half of the potential respondents of each population stratum 
were supplied with the party information, while the other half served as the control group. The 
design of the experimental extension of the basic choice experiment (with sample sizes for each 
treatment × stratum combination) is presented in Table 3. The five different questionnaire 
versions (choice set blocks) were replicated within these design cells. 
 
3.2. Survey procedures 
 
We initially determined a set of land-use attributes to represent useful descriptors of the 
landscape. Status quo levels of the attributes were collected from the Swiss land-use Statistics 
(FSO, 1992-97), the Swiss Federal Office of Agriculture, and the Canton of Zurich Office for 
Nature and Landscape. Based on a sequence of focus group sessions with representatives of the 
Federal Office of Agriculture, the Canton of Zurich Office for Nature and Landscape and two 
regional non-governmental organizations active in regional nature conservation, the set of 
attributes was slightly modified and realistic, policy-relevant attribute levels were determined. 
About 15 selected individuals were then asked to complete the questionnaire and were later 
interviewed about their experience with the task. Finally, a mail pre-test with n=70 addresses 
(yielding about 50 responses) was conducted to check understanding and response distributions. 
Ten respondents of this pre-test were individually contacted by phone and asked about their 
experience and satisfaction with the content of and the illustrations used in the questionnaire. For 
one attribute, attribute levels were changed as a consequence of the pre-test results.  
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The questionnaire consisted of five parts. In the first part, respondents were asked about 
their general attitudes towards the landscape and the role of the government in resource and 
landscape protection in agricultural areas. In the second part, the individual landscape 
components, forest, high-intensity grassland, crop land, low-intensity meadows, orchards, 
hedgerows, and trees, and nature reserves and their functions, were briefly described individually 
and illustrated with three or four photographs. Third, the respondents were introduced to the task 
of choosing their preferred policy alternative (landscape) in sets of two possible future 
landscapes in the Canton of Zurich, taking into account their tax payment. This text was 
accompanied by a pie chart showing the current allocation of land to the six different uses in the 
Canton of Zurich and by an example of a choice set. The fourth part contained the choice sets, 
numbered 1 through 8. Landscape attribute levels were illustrated in horizontal bar charts and the 
policy alternatives were labelled “Landscape A (Alternative)” and “Landscape B (Status Quo)”. 
The tax-bill attribute was given in words such as “2 percent less (corresponding in my case to 
CHF...)” or “unchanged”. A pictogram of a bill was inserted near the words “tax bill” in order to 
match the high visibility of the land-use attributes illustrated in the bar charts (Appendix, Fig. 1). 
The respondents could choose among A, B, and “no choice”. The choice sets were followed by a 
question about how certain respondents felt about their choices on a four-level ordinal scale. The 
final section contained six questions concerning socio-economic characteristics. Instead of the 
usual income question we asked respondents to specify how much (direct) tax they had paid in 
total in the previous year (to the nearest 500 SFR). We chose not to ask the respondents about 
their political position with respect to political parties or interest groups (see below) because we 
expected that such questions might interact with the valuation questions in undesired and 
uncontrolled ways. 
The national offices of political parties and important interest groups concerned with 
land-use issues were then contacted by phone and asked if they would be willing to provide their 
positions or choice recommendations for the 40 choice sets of the survey. Six of the eight parties 
and interest groups we contacted agreed to participate. The final questionnaire with all 40 choice 
sets was sent out to these organizations by mail. In most cases, specialized policy staff took 
charge of the task. The resulting choice recommendations spanned a wide spectrum of parties 
and relevant interest groups, as intended for the purposes of the experiment. Recommendations 
were obtained from the following organizations: People’s Party (SVP, right-wing), Christian 
Democrats (CVP, center), Social Democrats (SP, left-wing), Swiss Farmers Union, Swiss 
Consumer Forum (large consumer organization), and Pro Natura (largest NGO in Swiss nature 
conservation). For each block of the experimental design, a sheet with the recommendations was 
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then printed and included as a supplement in the questionnaires of the INFO subsample. The 
recommendations (choices A or B) were presented in tabular form, with questions one through 
eight in rows and parties/interest groups in columns. The names and functions of the 
organizations’ representatives who had provided the recommendations were listed below the 
table, and those two parties who did not provide their positions were also noted on the 
information sheet to make the party involvement as transparent as possible (Appendix, Fig. 2). 
The frequencies of A (alternative) and B (status quo) recommendations and of “no 
recommendation” for each party and interest group are listed in Table 4. 
Potential respondents to the mail survey were recruited by telephone. The target 
individuals were selected in a two-stage process to obtain a sample that corresponded well with 
the structure of the sampled population. First, random samples were drawn from the list of 
telephone numbers in the survey areas. The household structure was then surveyed, yielding 
number, age, and gender of all potential respondents in the household (citizens with the right to 
vote). A random sample of individuals was then drawn from the potential target members of the 
households. Households were contacted five times (on different days) before target respondents 
were replaced. A computer-assisted algorithm for selecting replacements ensured that the age 
and sex distribution in the sample remained close to census distributions. Within a few days, the 
questionnaires were sent by mail to the persons who had agreed to participate in the survey. 
About two weeks after they received the questionnaires, the participants were sent a short letter 
reminding them of the deadline. A more detailed account of the survey process is available in 
Schmitt et al. (2005). 
 
3.3. Hypotheses 
 
The experimental design permits us to test a number of hypotheses regarding the effects of the 
party information on stated preferences for public goods. First, we used Chi-square 
independence tests to examine whether the information treatment affected (i) the questionnaire 
return rate, (ii) the frequency of the four response options (alternative, status quo, “no choice” 
and item non-response) and the (iii) frequency of “no-choice” or item non-response in the 
valuation questions (choice sets), and (iv) the self-reported levels of certainty about the given 
responses: 
 H1: Freq(non-response)Control ≠ Freq(non-response)IS
 H2: Freq(response options)Control ≠ Freq(response options)IS
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H3: Freq(“no choice” or non-response)Control ≠ Freq(“no choice” or non-response)IS
 H4: Freq(certainty levels 1-4)Control ≠ Freq(certainty levels 1-4)IS
Second, we used random-effects Probit regression to estimate choice models of the binary 
(alternative vs. status quo) responses to the choice sets for each of the INFO × population 
subsamples. The random-effects model, as implemented in Limdep 7 (Greene, 1998), was used 
to account for preference heterogeneity and correlation among the multiple responses by 
individual respondents (see e.g. Holmes and Boyle, 2005). Furthermore, we computed benefit 
estimates for the proposed land-use changes. Based on the disaggregated estimates, we explored 
if the information shortcuts improved the correspondence of the benefit estimates with the same 
populations’ voting behaviour in recent voting decisions about agri-environmental policy and 
landscape protection financing (see ‘Experimental design’).  
To test the main and interactive effects of the INFO treatment we pooled the data of the 
subsamples to estimate models including as explanatory variables all main effects (INFO, 
population dummies and attributes), the two-way interactions (INFO×population, 
INFO×attribute, population×attribute), and the tree-way interactions 
(INFO×population×attribute). This model encompasses the following hypothesis tests (of linear 
restrictions on the individual β coefficients): 
 H5: βINFO×pop ≠ 0 
 H6: βINFO×attributes ≠ 0 
 H7: βINFO×pop×attributes ≠ 0 
Third, a simple Probit regression is used to test a series of hypotheses about the effects of 
the INFO treatment and its interaction with the individual-level characteristics “attitude” and 
“educational level” in each of the 40 choice sets. The selection of attitude and education was 
guided by previous research in the political sciences. Individual attitude is relevant because 
political scientist have argued that party positions may enable relatively uninformed voters to 
cast a vote in line with their interests and values (Lupia, 1994). Significant INFO×attitude 
interactions would suggest that the contextual information transformed the relationship between 
choices and underlying attitudes and values. Educational level is of interest because contextual 
information may be expected to affect voters differently across different levels of political 
knowledge.  
A variable “Attitude” was coded based on the responses to the question “Should the 
public spend rather more or rather less money for the protection and management of nature and 
landscape?” The response options were: “more”, “somewhat more”, “the same as today”, 
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“somewhat less”, “less” and “don’t know”. The question is not as ad hoc as might seem. A 
qualitative question about the direction of the respondents’ preferred amount of public 
expenditure for a broader class of public goods is something about which respondents may have 
consistent preferences because the question relates to the familiar issue of marginal changes of 
expenditure for an entire class of public goods from the status quo (see Background). Bergstrom 
et al. (1982) used the same question format arguing that it poses relatively low cognitive 
demands on the respondents. A variable “Education” was defined based on a standard question 
about “highest educational achievement”. The coding is from 1 for “mandatory schooling” to 5 
for “university degree” (see Table 6). For each of the 40 choice sets we thus estimate the Probit 
model: 
 
 Pr[yes] = Φ(α + β1INFOi + β2INFOi×Attitudei + β2INFOi×Educationi)  (1) 
 
The specific hypotheses about the effects of the information treatment and its interaction with the 
individual characteristics are tested as linear restrictions of the model. The (alternative) 
hypotheses are: 
H8: β1 ≠ 0 
H9: β2 ≠ 0 
H10: β3 ≠ 0 . 
Forth, we estimated choice models of the binary responses to the choice sets for the four 
INFO×Attitude subsamples, and we used the estimates to compute benefit estimates for the 
proposed land-use changes. A model of the pooled choice sets was used to test the effects of the 
two-and three-way interactions of INFO with Attitude the policy attributes as linear restrictions 
on the respective terms in the regression: 
H11: bINFO×attribute ≠ 0, 
H12: bINFO×Attitude×attributes ≠ 0 . 
Space limitations do not allow us to explain expectations concerning the effects each of the many 
variables in these models. However, at a more general level, the null hypothesis is simple. The 
prediction of the standard economic model is that individual choices are not affected by the 
INFO treatment (including by any interactions of INFO with other variables). 
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4. Results 
 
4.1. Response rates 
 
The response rate for the questionnaires was 69.8 percent. Due to variation in participation rates, 
the number of returned questionnaires was highest in the rural population and lowest in the urban 
population (Table 5).  
There was no effect of the INFO treatment on questionnaire return rates (see Table 3). 
The null hypothesis corresponding to H1 – no effect of INFO on participation rate – cannot be 
rejected. Chi-square independence and t-tests revealed no differences in socioeconomic 
characteristics between the respondents allocated to the INFO and the control treatments (Table 
6).  
 
4.2. Effects on the frequency of response categories 
 
The 546 survey respondents delivered a total of 3853 “Landscape A” (alternative) or “Landscape 
B” (status quo) choices. These choices were evenly distributed between the alternative (49.7 
percent) and the status quo (50.3 percent). Rates of approval of the alternative across the 40 
choice sets varied between 9 percent and 82 percent. There were 218 “no choice” and 297 item-
non-response answers. The frequency of these choices in the six subsamples is presented in 
Table 7. For the pooled populations, the INFO treatment affected the frequencies of the four 
response options (H2) and reduced the frequency of “no choice” or item non-response from 14.5 
percent in the control to 8.9 percent under the INFO treatment (Table 7, last column)(H3). The 
distribution of self-reported levels of certainty about the given responses (H4) did not 
significantly differ between treatments (χ2<3> = 1.45; p= 0.69 for the pooled data). 
 
4.3. Effects of the party information on the valuation of policy attributes – by population 
 
Table 8 presents the random-effects Probit models of the binary (alternative vs. status-quo) 
policy choices and WTP estimates for the six INFO × population subsamples. Under the control 
treatment, the cost attribute DTAX was non-significant in all three population subsamples. 
Under the INFO treatment, DTAX became significant in the periurban and rural populations and 
marginally significant in the urban subsample (t=1.56, p=0.12). In models with the pooled 
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population subsamples, the INFO treatment decreased the mean benefit estimates by between 30 
percent (for TREE) and 47 percent (for RESE). 
 WTP estimates were derived by computing the ratio of the coefficient estimate on the 
attribute of interest divided by the coefficient estimate on the tax attribute, i.e., the marginal rate 
of substitution between the attribute and the tax change (Table 8, columns headed “WTP”). For 
interpreting the attribute effects, it is important to notice that all attribute coefficients and benefit 
estimates refer to percentage land use changes in favour/at the expense of land in the omitted 
category high-input grassland (see Experimental design). 
 The decreased WTP in general, and the decreased WTP for nature reserves among the 
rural population in particular (cf. Table 2), suggest that the INFO treatment promoted consistent 
choices about the policy alternatives. 
 The tests of our hypotheses about the effects of INFO on the binary responses 
(hypotheses H5 through H7) are encompassed by the model with the pooled samples that 
includes the interactions of the attributes with the additional design factors as additional 
explanatory variables. The complete model estimates are available on request. The significant 
terms (with coefficient signs) in the model are CROP (+), LOWI (+), INFO×Rural (positive 
effect relative to Urban reference), CROP×Periurban (+), CROP×Rural (+), CROP×INFO (+), 
and CROP×INFO×Periurban (–). Hence, only the effect of CROP – the most highly significant 
attribute in the subsamples (see Table 8) – was consistently affected by the INFO treatment. The 
coefficient signs agree with expectations. They suggest that rural respondents valued the extent 
of cropped land more highly relative to the urban and periurban respondents, and that this effect 
was enhanced by the INFO treatment. Restrictions on entire sets of variables were not 
significant. Wald tests yielded the following results: for βINFO×attributes=0, χ2 =9.98 (p=0.13); for 
βattributes×Periurban×IS=0, χ2 =9.74 (p=0.14); and for βattributes×Rural×IS=0, χ2 =5.67 (p=0.46). 
 
4.4. Interactions of the party information with respondent attitude and education 
 
Table 9 (upper part) shows the experimental design for the analysis of the interaction between 
the INFO treatment and individual attitudes towards public spending for nature and landscape 
conservation. 
 Table 10 presents the Probit estimates (Equation 1 in section 3.3) for the 40 individual 
choice sets, providing the tests of hypotheses H8, through H10. The party information 
significantly affected the decisions in 24 out of the 40 choice sets either directly or through the 
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interaction with individual-level characteristics. The INFO treatment significantly changed the 
effect of Attitude (INFO×Attitude) in 19 choices sets, indicating that the information context 
transformed the mapping from general attitudes to dollar preferences for specific policies. 
Furthermore, INFO interacted with Education in only 8 choice sets, which suggests that the use 
of simplified heuristics was not limited to respondents with low levels of education. 
 
4.5. Effects of the party information on the valuation of policy attributes – by attitude 
 
Table 11 presents the random-effects Probit estimates of the attribute-based referendum model 
for the four INFO×Attitude subsamples. The WTP estimates were derived as in Table 8. While 
these models do yet provide a test of whether the INFO×Attitude interaction systematically 
affected the valuation of the policy attributes, they provide a descriptive overview of the data and 
facilitate the interpretation of the following model with the pooled subsamples and including the 
interactions terms (see Table 12). Among the respondents with a taste for increasing public 
spending for landscape amenities management (Attitude=1), the party information decreased the 
mean benefit estimates for CROP by about 58 percent, for LOWI by 14 percent, for TREE by 70 
percent and for RESE by 58 percent. The INFO treatment thus decreased the WTP estimates on 
average by about 50 percent. These results indicate that individuals who are generally supportive 
of nature and landscape protection formed different preferences for the land-use attributes when 
the party positions were available. Among the remaining respondents, the party positions 
decreased WTP for RESE by 46 percent. Estimates for the remaining attributes are not reliable 
due to non-significant coefficients in the choice models of the respective subsamples. 
 Two further patterns which parallel those described in Section 4.3 suggest that the party 
information enhanced the validity of the choices. First, the tax change specified in the choice sets 
(DTAX) was only weakly significant or even insignificant in the respondent subsamples which 
did not have access to the party positions. In the subsamples with party information, the tax 
change was significant at p<0.05. Second, the amount of land allocated to uses generally 
regarded as landscape amenities (LOWI and RESE) was valued even by respondents with 
negative or neutral attitudes towards public spending for nature and landscape. This counter-
intuitive result disappeared when these respondents had access to the party information (Table 
11, last column; LOWI, ORCH and RESE non-significant). 
Table 12 presents the random-effects Probit model of the pooled samples, encompassing 
the tests of hypotheses H11 and H12. Regarding hypothesis H11, the INFO treatment interacted 
significantly (positively) with TREE. Of particular interest are the three-way 
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attribute×INFO×Attitude interactions (H12). In the regression framework these terms essentially 
test if the party information had an influence on how individuals mapped from attitudes to dollar 
preferences for landscape attributes. The information treatment interacted significantly with two 
of the three-way interaction terms, LOWI×INFO×Additude and the TREE×INFO×Attitude. 
Lacking clear-cut theoretical expectations on the direction of the Attitude effect in these 
models it is difficult to interpret the individual parameter estimates of this model in detail. 
Instead, we used Wald tests to examine if the interaction terms involving INFO are jointly 
significant in the model. The six attribute×INFO interactions are jointly significant at the 10 
percent level (χ2 =11.2; p= 0.082). The six attribute×INFO×Attitude interactions and the twelve 
terms together are marginally significant (χ2 =9.52, p= 0.146 and χ2= 17.6, p=0.128, 
respectively). Adding to this the results presented in Table 11 the more general lesson is clear. 
Knowledge of party positions itself and in interaction with respondent attitudes influenced the 
valuation of policy attributes. In other words, the economic preferences for the public good were 
driven by the interaction of (i) the public good attributes, (ii) the attitude towards the broader 
class of public good to which the proposed policies belong, and (iii) the party information 
relating to the specific policy alternatives. The present analyses thus pinpoint the role of credible 
party and interest group positions on which cognitively limited respondents rely in their 
decisions about public goods. 
 
4.6 Effects of the party information on the valuation of policy attributes – by tax amounts 
 
Given that our experiment formulated the costs of the proposed policies as a percentage change 
in the tax bills, it is also of interest to examine choice models for respondent groups with 
different (lower vs. higher) tax bills. As in the analysis of choices for respondents with different 
attitudes we stratified the sample, but this time according to three tax bill categories (see Table 9, 
lower part). The cut-off levels were again chosen to yield about equal sample sizes in the 
categories. 
 Table 13 presents the random-effects Probit estimates of the attribute based referendum 
model for the six INFO×Tax bill subsamples. The WTP estimates were derived as in Table 8 and 
11. The tax attribute was non-significant in all subsamples without the party information. Among 
the subsamples with party information only the subsample of respondents with low tax bills 
(taxes below 4000 CHF per year) was insensitive to the costs. The medium and high tax-bill 
groups yielded significant coefficient estimates in spite of the limited sample size. The WTP 
estimates for these samples were decreased by a factor of about 2 to 10 compared with the 
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samples without the party information. Hence, at least for the medium and high tax bills, these 
analyses again suggest that the INFO treatment promoted realistic and consistent choices about 
the policy alternatives. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Political scientists have suggested that voters in public referenda may rationally use information 
short cuts such as party positions to “vote their interests” in spite of limited factual knowledge 
about the propositions. Here, we examined how access to credible party positions affects 
individual choices about complex public goods in an environmental valuation context. We found 
that offering information about the positions of political parties and interest groups to the 
respondents in a referendum choice experiment affected stated choices about public goods in 
several ways. Relative to our control, the party information reduced the frequency of non-usable 
responses, it decreased the implicit benefit estimates for the proposed policies especially among 
respondents with medium to high tax bills, and it transformed the mapping from general attitudes 
towards public spending for nature and landscape conservation to preferences for specific 
policies. Several aspects of these results deserve further discussion. 
As in the related political science literature, it is difficult to establish if the party 
information improved the quality of the decisions. We do not have actual voting decisions on the 
same issue available as a basis for assessing the external validity of the survey responses and the 
effects of the information treatment upon this quality (cf. Schläpfer et al., 2005). However, the 
result that the information treatment tended to enhance the respondents’ sensitivity to the (tax) 
price and hence decreased the WTP estimates lends support to the interpretation that the 
information treatment enhanced the validity of the survey responses. To compare, Macmillan et 
al. (2002) who examine the effect of allowing contingent valuation (CV) respondents to discuss 
the choice issue before giving their responses, find that WTP under the discussion treatment was 
about seventy percent lower than in the control, which was a standard interview. 
The magnitude of the treatment effects is likely to be specific to the particular 
experimental protocol and policy propositions. As mentioned previously, the cost attribute was 
specified as a percentage change in the annual tax bill. This was a precondition for interest 
groups to be able to provide voter recommendations. However, recent work by Green et al. 
(1998), Champ et al. (2002), Schläpfer and Bräuer (2007), and Flores and Strong (2007) suggests 
that this formulation also increases the credibility of the valuation questions because the 
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randomly assigned (tax) prices are less likely to conflict with expectations of the personal costs if 
the policy is actually implemented. These authors have noted that typical variations of randomly 
assigned cost figures between 1$ and 500$ or more may undermine the credibility of the policy 
scenarios and offer opportunities for strategic answering. Compared with standard formats where 
the cost attribute is specified in absolute money units, the enhanced credibility of the alternatives 
may thus have promoted consistent responses also in our baseline (control) treatment. 
The approach taken in the present study suggests a novel solution to the problem of 
providing “adequate” information in stated preference surveys. The NOAA panel report 
recognizes that problem in stating (Arrow et al., 1993): “Since the design of the CV survey can 
have a substantial effect on the responses, it is desirable that – if possible – critical features be 
pre-approved by both sides [...]” (p. 4614). To our knowledge there has not been any research in 
the direction of this particular recommendation of the NOAA panel. The implicit pre-approval of 
the survey design by the parties providing their positions is similar to what the NOAA panel 
suggests. Moreover, by introducing elements of an open, competitive political information 
environment, the approach to some extent eliminates the problematic information monopoly of 
the survey researcher. Finally, obtaining party positions from diverse political parties and interest 
groups requires a careful and balanced presentation of the information in the first place. The 
increased publicity of the survey process may operate as an incentive for researchers to develop 
high-quality survey instruments and for reputable parties to provide carefully considered, 
credible positions. 
Our experiment fills an important gap between the correlative field studies by political 
scientists (Lupia, 1994; Bowler and Donovan, 1998; Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004; Druckman 
2004), theoretical and experimental work on bounded rationality (Conlisk 1996; Ariely et al. 
2003; Frey and Eichenberger, 1994; McFadden, 1999; Payne et al., 1999; Camerer, 1995; 
Slembeck and Tyran, 2004; Vatn, 2004; Gowdy, 2004; Camerer and Fehr, 2006) and recent 
experiments on the role of social interactions in surveys of stated preferences for public goods 
(MacMillan et al., 2002; List et al., 2004; Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006, Alvarez-Farizo et 
al., 2007). Our experiment makes the previous findings fruitful for applied valuation research. 
Although we do not know which particular recommendations were followed by which 
respondents, the aggregate patterns support the conclusion that the positions of competing parties 
play a central role in consistent individual decisions about public goods. The study demonstrates 
that surveys that provide information about credible party positions are a feasible alternative 
approach to survey-based preferences elicitation.  
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6. Conclusions 
 
Our study is the first to cleanly identify the interactive effects of information context, policy 
characteristics, and individual characteristics in decisions about public goods. We experimentally 
confirmed the political scientists’ interpretation that preferences for unfamiliar public goods are 
constructed from underlying attitudes and values using simplified heuristics based on the 
positions of familiar parties and interest groups with known ideological orientation (Lupia and 
Matsusaka, 2004). The findings suggest that economic models of voting are incomplete in the 
sense that they do not explicitly account for the role of contextual information generated by 
political institutions such as political parties and public debate. This model incompleteness is 
potentially problematic in situations where access to the positions of credible parties cannot be 
taken for granted, as in voting decisions in less developed democracies or in surveys. 
 The findings are also potentially relevant for future research on stated preferences for 
public goods as they suggest that many survey respondents, like voters in referenda, may not be 
able to make reasoned decisions without access to contextual signals. Stated preferences with 
access to information cues from reputable competing parties and interest groups are an 
alternative approach to preference elicitation. The approach combines the advantages of a fully 
controlled good with an information context that is similar to the information context of an actual 
referendum. Furthermore, the approach at least partly eliminates the problematic information 
monopoly of the survey researcher. The approach can thus be seen as a promising avenue among 
recent attempts to widen perspectives in the valuation of public goods (Frey and Stutzer, 2002; 
van Praag and Baarsma, 2005). 
There is much more to be learned about the role of simplified heuristics in decisions 
about public goods. Potential topics include experiments with different types of contextual cues 
and in different political systems, studies on individual updating behaviour when the party 
information becomes available, or experiments on the role of reputation effects for the credibility 
and use of contextual cues. Such experiments would be most interesting and relevant to 
environmental valuation research if they involved field samples and actual policy issues. 
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Table 1. Attribute definitions and levels 
Variable name Attribute definition a Levelsb
FORE Forest land (%) 28, 30, 32 
(…) c High-input grassland (%) ... 20 ... 
CROP Field crops (%) 10, 14, 18 
LOWI Low-input grassland (%) 4, 6 
TREE Field hedges, field trees, traditional orchards (%) 3, 4, 5 
RESE Nature reserves (%) 1, 2 
DTAX Change of tax bill (%) -2, -1, 0 
a Land area is expressed relative to the total land surface. 
b Status quo levels are printed bold. 
c Variable omitted in the model. Value in the choice sets given by 74 (percentage of undeveloped 
land) minus the sum of the areas (attribute levels) of all other land uses combined. 
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Table 2. Income, employment in the agricultural sector and past voting behavior of the sampled 
populations 
Urban Periurban Rural  
Zurich Faellanden Greifensee Grueningen Baeretswil
Mean taxable income (1000 
SFR) a
52.0 66.8 61.5 56.0 51.3 
Employment in agricultural 
sector (%) a
0.1 3.6 1.4 15.4 21.4 
Approval of NHP proposal 
(%) b
65 60 57 51 45 
 
Approval difference 
agricultural policy proposals 
1996 and 1995 c
47 42 44 26 28 
a Data 1996 (COS, 1999). 
b Percentage ‘yes’ in a 1996 cantonal referendum on a CHF 10 million increase in the annual 
instalments to the cantonal fund for nature and heritage protection (Executive Council, 1996b); 
see Schläpfer and Hanley (2003) for a description of the proposition. 
c Differences between aggregate (municipality-level) voting returns in two consecutive national 
referenda on new constitutional articles to reform agricultural policy. The first (1995) 
proposition was controversial (and rejected in the vote) mainly because direct payments to 
farmers were not clearly linked with ecological services. The second (1996) proposition 
explicitly made direct payments dependent on fulfilling a set of ecological requirements and was 
approved by a large majority (78 % of the votes) (Executive Council, 1995; 1996a). 
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Table 3. Experimental design with stratification by populations 
Information treatment Stratification 
Party information (INFO=1) No party information (INFO=0)
Urban 66 (501) 72 (520) 
Periurban (Periurban=1) 92 (666) 97 (678) 
Rural (Rural=1) 103 (736) 111 (752) 
Note: Entries are number of respondents and number of choices (in parentheses). 
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Table 4. Frequency of the party positions “alternative”, “status quo” and “no recommendation” 
for the six political parties and interest groups 
Party or interest group Alternative Status quo No recommendation 
People’s Party 5 35 0 
Christian Democrats 6 34 0 
Social Democrats  16 24 0 
Swiss Consumer Forum 15 25 0 
Pro Natura 31 4 5 
Swiss Farmers Union 5 27 8 
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Table 5. Participation rates 
 
Total Urban Periurban Rural 
 Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Initial addresses 1860 100.0 620 100.0 620 100 620 100.0 
Recruited 
individuals 782 42.0 210 33.9 283 45.6 289 46.6 
Questionnaires 
distributed 782 100.0 210 100.0 283 100 289 100.0 
Questionnaires 
returned 546 69.8 143 68.1 189 66.8 214 74.0 
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Table 6. Statistical comparison of respondent characteristics between the experimental 
treatments (subsamples with and without party information) 
Variable Description Descriptive 
statisticsa
Test 
statisticb
Age Categories: 1=less than 20; 2 = 20–29; 3 = 30–39; ... 
7= 70 or above. 
4.62 
(1.55) 
n=517 
χ2<6>=2.05
Gender Binary variable: 0 = male; 1 = female. 0.54 
(0.50) 
n=516 
χ2<1>=0.0 
Education Categories for educational level: ranging from 1 = 
mandatory schooling only to 5 = college or 
university degree. 
3.09 
(1.32) 
n=512 
χ2<4>=4.47
Residency Length of residency in the Canton of Zurich (in 
years). 
39.1 
(18.2) 
n=511 
t<1>=0.48 
Tax bill Continuous variable for total annual individual 
direct tax payments (CHF). 
9347 
(16,722) 
n=477 
t<1>=0.25 
Attitude Categories for preferred level of cantonal 
expenditures for nature and landscape protection 
relative to current level: 1 = less; 2 = rather less; 3= 
same amount; 4 = rather more; 5 = more. 
3.62 
(0.98) 
n=478 
χ2<4>=2.98
a The descriptive statistics for each variable are mean, standard deviation, and sample size. 
b Test statistic for the null hypotheses that the distributions of responses are the same, with 
degrees of freedom (two-sided test). 
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Table 7. Frequency of responses by population and information treatment and test 
results for split-sample comparison 
Frequency of responses Population Treatment split 
samples tested A B “No 
choice” 
Non-
response
χ2<3> 
statistic 
χ2<1>
(A+B vs. 
other) 
Urban INFO 255 246 11 16 
 Control 262 258 30 66 
33.1*** 8.08***
Periurban INFO 321 345 46 24 
 Control 295 383 41 57 
15.8*** 3.71* 
Rural INFO 410 326 33 55 
 Control 395 357 57 79 
10.0** 33.0***
Pooled INFO 986 917 90 95 
 Control 952 998 128 202 
40.8*** 32.5***
Note: Significance levels: *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1. 
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Table 8. Random-effects Probit estimates for the six information × population subsamples 
Without party information 
 Urban Periurban Rural 
Variable Coefficient WTPa Coefficient WTPPa Coefficient WTPPa
Constant -3.2139**  -5.4279***  -3.8742***  
 (2.39)  (4.45)  (3.38)  
FORE -0.0071 0.32 0.0387 0.27 -0.0188 -0.19 
 (0.18)  (1.08)  (0.57)  
CROP 0.1319*** -5.89 0.2239*** 1.56 0.1762*** 1.74 
 (6.34)  (12.79)  (11.29)  
LOWI 0.1840** -8.21 0.0398 0.28 0.2267*** 2.24 
 (2.25)  (0.68)  (3.87)  
TREE 0.1012 -4.52 0.1426* 0.99 0.0801 0.79 
 (1.13)  (1.78)  (1.16)  
RESE 0.2007 -8.96 0.3655*** 2.55 0.2164* 2.14 
 (1.34)  (2.63)  (1.77)  
DTAX 0.0224  -0.1436  -0.1011  
 (0.231)  (1.46)  (1.48)  
ρ 0.6122***  0.6039***  0.4961***  
 (9.43)  (10.63)  (8.69)  
N 520  678  752  
Log-L. -272.1  -337.5  -405.1  
Log-L. restricted -297.2  -415.9  -472.3  
With party information 
 Urban Periurban Rural 
 Coefficient WTPa Coefficient WTPPa Coefficient WTPPa
Constant -5.1278***  -3.2511***  -1.5855  
 (3.78)  (2.66)  (1.40)  
FORE 0.0020 0.01 -0.0312 -0.17 -0.1120*** -0.72 
 (0.05)  (0.85)  (3.12)  
CROP 0.1750*** 1.27 0.1803*** 0.97 0.2066*** 1.33 
 (8.03)  (10.99)  (10.49)  
LOWI 0.2338*** 1.69 0.1485** 0.80 0.1609** 1.04 
 (3.21)  (2.31)  (2.39)  
TREE 0.2164** 1.57 0.0920 0.50 0.1461 0.94 
 (2.56)  (1.29)  (1.59)  
RESE 0.2705* 1.96 0.3206*** 1.73 0.2044* 1.32 
 (1.63)  (2.84)  (1.74)  
DTAX -0.1382  -0.1852**  -0.1552**  
 (1.56)  (2.37)  (2.02)  
ρ 0.5452***  0.4718***  0.6073***  
 (7.66)  (7.60)  (0.0574)  
N 501  666  736  
Log-L. -261.7  -360.5  -363.4  
Log-L. restricted -312.3  -425.6  -442.3  
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; significance levels, see Table 7.  
aWTP is the willingness-to-pay (in tax percentages) computed as bX/-bDTAX. Values 
computed from non-significant coefficients in italics.
Table 9. Experimental designs with alternative stratifications of the sample 
Information treatment 
Stratification 
Party 
information 
(INFO=1) 
No party 
information 
(INFO=0) 
by attitude towards spending for nature and landscape   
“Spend (rather) more” (Attitude=1) 135 (1052) 133 (975) 
Other responses (Attitude=0) 112 (851) 133 (975) 
by annual tax bill   
< 4000 CHF 72 (565) 87 (638) 
4001 to 8000 CHF 93 (712) 71 (535) 
> 8000 CHF 74 (564)  80 (611) 
Note: Entries are number of respondents and number of choices (in parentheses). 
 
32 
Table 10. Probit estimates for the individual choice sets. 
 Policy characteristics Constant INFO INFO×Attitude INFO×Education   
Policy FORE CROP LOWI ORCH RESE DTAX Coeff. t-ratio Coeff.a t-ratio Coeff. a t-ratio Coeff. a t-ratio N % yes b
SQ c 28 18 4 3 1 0 ― ― ― ― ― ― 
1 28 14 6 4 2 -1 0.450 2.42 -4.326** -2.43 1.205*** 2.81 -0.045 -0.22 86 66
2 30 14 4 5 1 -2 0.084 0.45 0.311 0.25 0.381 1.48 -0.320 -1.51 81 63
3 32 18 6 3 2 0 0.298 1.60 -3.679*** -2.75 0.682** 2.55 0.396* 1.93 84 62
4 28 10 4 5 2 -1 -0.641 -3.22 -2.044 -1.48 0.430 1.53 0.155 0.82 80 28
5 32 18 4 4 2 -1 0.431 2.30 -3.716** -2.53 0.908*** 2.77 0.103 0.54 85 66
6 28 10 6 5 1 0 -0.512 -2.64 -1.479 -1.01 0.517 1.64 -0.196 -1.05 82 29
7 32 10 6 3 1 -1 -0.641 -3.22 -4.385** -2.41 1.014*** 2.64 0.134 0.69 82 27
8 28 10 6 5 2 -2 -0.311 -1.64 -2.096 -1.64 0.607** 2.20 0.123 0.63 79 47
9 28 18 6 3 1 -2 0.951 4.11 -2.166* -1.80 0.515* 1.83 -0.002 -0.01 84 79
10 30 18 4 5 2 0 0.586 2.88 -2.614** -2.20 0.420 1.59 0.237 1.54 86 66
11 30 14 6 5 2 -1 0.518 2.58 -3.728*** -2.79 0.746** 2.54 0.132 0.84 85 60
12 32 10 4 4 1 0 -0.805 -3.51 -2.140 -0.99 0.102 0.23 0.354 1.32 80 15
13 32 10 6 3 2 -2 -0.279 -1.40 -1.430 -1.11 0.330 1.18 -0.067 -0.41 84 32
14 28 10 4 4 2 0 -0.755 -3.43 -0.620 -0.47 0.100 0.34 0.071 0.40 81 22
15 32 14 4 5 2 -2 0.637 3.06 -3.000** -2.41 0.491* 1.79 0.156 1.04 85 61
16 32 10 4 5 1 -1 -0.618 -2.94 0.022 0.02 -0.091 -0.30 -0.048 -0.27 84 20
17 28 18 6 5 2 0 0.656 3.17 -0.127 -0.11 0.091 0.37 0.065 0.32 86 80
18 30 18 6 3 2 -2 0.805 3.51 -1.846* -1.73 0.112 0.49 0.406** 2.09 81 77
19 28 18 4 4 1 -1 0.899 3.81 -1.287 -1.13 0.126 0.50 0.290 1.41 81 82
20 32 14 6 4 1 0 0.336 1.62 -2.086** -2.08 0.226 1.13 0.307* 1.76 79 59
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(Table 10 continued) 
 Policy characteristics Constant INFO INFO × attitude INFO × education   
Policy FORE CROP LOWI ORCH RESE DTAX Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. a t-ratio Coeff. a t-ratio Coeff. a t-ratio N % yes b
21 30 10 4 3 2 -1 -0.555 -2.58 -0.769 -0.75 0.180 0.88 0.026 0.15 79 29
22 28 10 6 3 2 0 -0.674 -2.97 -1.078 -1.02 0.290 1.41 0.011 0.07 79 27
23 32 18 6 5 2 -2 0.476 2.33 -2.281** -2.05 0.419* 1.75 0.232 1.27 82 70
24 30 14 4 3 1 0 -0.842 -3.48 0.936 0.88 -0.150 -0.69 -0.097 -0.53 76 21
25 28 18 4 5 2 -2 0.730 3.46 -1.608* -1.80 0.260 1.28 0.305 1.61 91 78
26 28 14 4 5 1 0 0.084 0.45 -1.788** -2.17 0.276 1.25 -0.020 -0.11 91 38
27 32 18 6 5 1 -1 0.172 0.90 -2.959*** -3.46 0.364* 1.93 0.564*** 3.34 93 55
28d 28 10 4 3 1 -2 -1.180 -4.70 64.409 0.00 -14.493 0.00 -20.718 0.00 90 8
29 32 10 6 5 2 0 -0.114 -0.60 -2.885*** -2.98 0.632** 2.55 0.101 0.59 90 41
30 30 18 6 3 1 0 0.605 2.99 -2.573*** -3.10 0.327* 1.74 0.396** 2.35 91 67
31 32 10 4 4 2 -2 -0.303 -1.54 -2.197*** -2.61 0.323* 1.71 0.313* 1.91 89 36
32 32 14 4 3 2 0 0.196 1.04 -2.348*** -2.86 0.534** 2.56 0.097 0.60 93 55
33 28 18 6 5 1 -2 0.566 2.98 -1.541 -1.18 0.439 1.55 0.129 0.69 98 78
34 32 18 4 3 1 -2 0.188 1.02 -1.026 -0.95 0.224 0.96 0.098 0.67 96 59
35 30 10 6 4 2 0 -0.055 -0.29 -1.629 -1.42 0.381 1.52 -0.001 -0.01 92 43
36 28 10 6 3 1 -1 -0.658 -3.32 -2.465* -1.89 0.636** 2.19 0.079 0.50 94 29
37 32 14 6 3 1 -2 0.180 1.00 -2.627** -2.32 0.506** 2.02 0.248* 1.65 98 57
38 32 18 4 5 1 0 0.319 1.73 -3.368*** -2.64 0.785*** 2.69 0.126 0.83 98 60
39 28 14 4 3 2 -2 -0.140 -0.75 -2.516** -2.20 0.451* 1.82 0.263* 1.76 95 44
40 30 10 6 4 1 -2 0.055 0.29 -3.766*** -2.90 0.751*** 2.62 0.229 1.47 94 47
a Significance levels: see Table 7. 
b Percentage yes to alternative policy (vs. status quo). 
c Status quo policy. 
d Estimates unreliable; data distribution does not satisfy model assumptions. 
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Table 11. Random-effects Probit estimates for the four information × attitude subsamples 
 Without party information With party information 
 
Attitude=1 (spend 
more) 
 Attitude=0 (other 
responses) 
Attitude=1 (spend 
more) 
 Attitude=0 (other 
responses) 
 Coefficient WTP a  Coefficient WTP a Coefficient WTPP a  Coefficient WTPP a
Constant -4.8450***   -3.5313***  -5.2592***   -0.6555  
 (-4.81)   (-3.69)  (-5.24)   (-0.66)  
FORE 0.0038 0.06  -0.0026 -0.02 -0.0071 -0.05  -0.1066*** -0.57 
 (0.13)   (-0.09)  (-0.24)   (-3.30)  
CROP 0.2008*** 3.37  0.1599*** 1.43 0.2035*** 1.43  0.1732*** 0.93 
 (14.07)   (12.21)  (15.57)   (9.30)  
LOWI 0.1460*** 2.45  0.1727*** 1.54 0.3019*** 2.12  0.0248 0.13 
 (2.97)   (3.16)  (6.02)   (0.40)  
ORCH 0.2457*** 4.13  -0.0187 -0.17 0.1789*** 1.25  0.1115 0.60 
 (3.77)   (-0.31)  (2.94)   (1.50)  
RESE 0.3473*** 5.83  0.1805* 1.61 0.3460**** 2.42  0.1616 0.87 
 (3.10)   (1.69)  (3.40)   (1.45)  
DTAX -0.0595   -0.1120*  -0.1428**   -0.1866**  
 (-0.82)   (-1.73)  (-2.38)   (-2.43)  
Rho 0.5403***   0.5793***  0.4803***   0.5764***  
 (10.89)   (12.08)  (9.54)   (10.78)  
N 975 975 1052  851 
Log-l. -491.4  -521.8 -541.2  -428 
Log-l. restr. -582.8  -625.8 -616.4  -517 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; significance levels, see Table 7. 
a WTP is the willingness-to-pay (in tax percentages) computed as bX/-bDTAX. Values 
computed from non-significant coefficients in italics. 
 
Table 12. Random-effects Probit model including the interactions 
of the policy attributes with INFO and Attitude (pooled samples) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic a
Constant -3.6835*** -7.58 
FORE 0.0033 0.19 
CROP 0.1568*** 12.43 
LOWI 0.1715*** 3.28 
ORCH -0.0128 -0.22 
RESE 0.1825* 1.74 
DTAX -0.1106* -1.73 
FORE × INFO -0.0271 -1.30 
CROP × INFO 0.0183 0.86 
LOWI × INFO -0.1053 -1.35 
ORCH × INFO 0.1699* 1.89 
RESE × INFO 0.0281 0.18 
DTAX × INFO -0.0971 -0.99 
FORE × Attitude -0.0291* -1.75 
CROP × Attitude 0.0420** 2.28 
LOWI × Attitude -0.0435 -0.61 
ORCH × Attitude 0.2348*** 2.77 
RESE × Attitude 0.1404 0.94 
DTAX × Attitude 0.0590 0.61 
FORE × INFO× Attitude 0.0019 0.07 
CROP × INFO× Attitude -0.0115 -0.41 
LOWI × INFO × Attitude 0.2589** 2.49 
ORCH × INFO × Attitude -0.2390 -1.94 
RESE × INFO × Attitude -0.0321 -0.15 
DTAX × INFO × Attitude 0.0131 0.10 
ρ 0.5406*** 21.53 
N 3853 
Log-likelihood -1989.9 
Log-likelihood restricted -2346.5 
Note: Significance levels: see Table 7. 
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Table 13. Random-effects Probit estimates for six information × tax-bill subsamples 
Without party information 
 Tax bill < 4000 Tax bill 4001−8000 Tax bill > 8000 
Variable Coefficient WTP Coefficient WTP Coefficient WTP 
Constant -2.1147*  -5.1533***  -6.7422***  
 (1.70)  (3.66)  (4.57)  
FORE -0.0239 -0.29 0.0060 0.09 0.0597 1.85
 (0.61)  (0.15)  (1.52)  
CROP 0.1728*** 2.08 0.1934*** 2.94 0.1982*** 6.13
 (11.02)  (9.52)  (10.97)  
LOWI 0.0438 0.53 0.2158*** 3.29 0.2305*** 7.13
 (0.79)  (2.60)  (3.08)  
TREE 0.0038 0.05 0.1910** 2.91 0.2095** 6.48
 (0.05)  (2.06)  (2.46)  
RESE 0.1067 1.28 0.2334 3.55 0.2865** 8.86
 (0.82)  (1.44)  (2.01)  
DTAX -0.0832  -0.0657  -0.0323  
 (1.05)  (0.59)  (0.38)  
ρ 0.4408***  0.6799***  0.5532  
 (6.93)  (11.73)  (8.82)  
N 638 535 611 
Log-L. -359.8 -258.4 -314.2 
Log-L. restricted -402.3 -340.9 -373.0 
With party information 
 Tax bill < 4000 Tax bill 4001-8000 Tax bill > 8000 
Variable Coefficient WTP Coefficient WTP Coefficient WTP 
Constant -1.8137  -3.5785***  -3.5554**  
 (1.40)  (2.82)  (2.50)  
FORE -0.0663 -0.82 -0.0648* -0.27 -0.0499 -0.18
 (1.53)  (1.72)  (1.21)  
CROP 0.1617*** 2.00 0.2087*** 0.87 0.1970*** 0.71
 (7.46)  (10.76)  (10.45)  
LOWI 0.1295* 1.61 0.2181*** 0.91 0.2391*** 0.86
 (1.91)  (3.20)  (3.01)  
TREE 0.1542* 1.91 0.1520* 0.64 0.1609* 0.58
 (2.01)  (1.88)  (1.69)  
RESE 0.0198 0.25 0.4210*** 1.76 0.2239 0.81
 (0.16)  (3.20)  (1.40)  
DTAX -0.0806  -0.2387***  -0.2767***  
 (1.04)  (2.94)  (2.70)  
ρ 0.4673***  0.5867***  0.5993***  
 (6.70)  (10.52)  (9.58)  
N 565 712 564 
Log-L. -312.2 -352.0 -279.5 
Log-L. restricted -352.9 -429.4 -339.9 
Notes: See Table 8. 
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Figure legends (Appendix) 
 
 
Appendix Figure 1 Example of a choice set (translated from German). 
 
 
Appendix Figure 2 Party and interest group positions (information shortcuts sheet for the 8 
choice sets of Block 1; translated from German). 
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Orchards, hedgerows 
Nature reserves 
High-intensity grassland 
Example       Landscape A (Alternative)        Landscape B (Status 
Q )
unchanged 1 percent less  
(corresponding in my case to ……  CHF) 
Low-intensity meadows 
Crop land 
Forest 2 8 %
2 0 %
18 %
4 %
3 %
1 %
3 2 %
1 8 %
4 %
4 %
2 %
1 4 %
My tax bill will be …
I prefer landscape      ?             ?       no choice  ?
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Choice recommendations of parties and interest groups (enclosure with the questionnaire) 
 
 
In questions 2.1 to 2.8 the representatives of the listed parties and interest groups recommend you tick the following landscapes: 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 
      
 
 
 
     BAUERNVERBAND 
2.1 B B A A A no recommendation 
2.2 B B A no recommendation A B 
2.3 B B B A A B 
2.4 B B B A B no recommendation 
2.5 B B A no recommendation A B 
2.6 B A B A B no recommendation 
2.7 B B B A B B 
2.8 B B B A B no recommendation 
 
 
 
Note: 
These recommendations do not necessarily correspond with the official opinion of the parties and interest groups. The “voting recommendations” originate from the following individuals who expressed 
the position of their party (or their interest group) regarding each future landscape development given: 
SVP Jeannine Grünenfelder (scientific staff) 
CVP Michela Trisconi (scientific staff) 
SP Matthias Manz (policy field director) 
Pro Natura:   Pascale Aubert (project leader agriculture & nature conservation); Ulrich Berchtold (project leader species- & habitat protection) 
Konsumentenforum:   Marianne Cserhati-Hotz (President, Konsumentenforum Canton of Zurich) 
Bauernverband:   Marco Baltensweiler (head, section of agricultural economics); Mr. Baltensweiler gave the answer recommendations from of a long-term, future-oriented perspective 
 
No recommendations could be obtained from the FDP and the Grüne within the time available
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